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INTRODUCTION
Few issues unify a community like the potential that alocal water source might be privatized, particularly by aforeign multinational water or energy conglomerate.
Communities across the globe react passionately to stop private
takeovers of publicly owned treatment works, whether it is an
operations and management contract, or the actual purchase of
the facility.  Commonly cited examples include the failed priva-
tizations in Cochabamba, Bolivia; canceled contracts in Manila,
Philippines and in Atlanta, GA; and the public outcry that halt-
ed a contract in Stockton, CA.  The
Bolivia contract is particularly relevant
to the U.S. trend toward private owner-
ship of water.  Bechtel held the rights not
only to provide water services, but also
to charge residents for rainwater collect-
ed from their roofs.  
In the U.S., private interests are
responding to water scarcity by investing
in water rights and land in order to sell it
to the highest bidder.  Generally this is a
transfer from agricultural use to munici-
pal use.  Citizens in the source communi-
ties are protesting these ventures that may
affect their access to water, the value of
their property, and the economic develop-
ment of their communities.  Government
officials are considering whether private
individuals should be allowed to sell
water (which is legally the property of the
state held in trust for the public good)
back to the public at a profit.
This paper examines how current
trends in private investment, including
investor rights and government obliga-
tions under international trade agree-
ments, may complicate public control of water supplies.  While
the free market approach to water management may be attractive
to states that either require more or have excess water to sell, the
economic and environmental effects of long-term transfers of
water control to the private sector are largely unknown.  Foreign
participation in delivering services and buying on the market
increases the likelihood that U.S. regulations will be challenged
under international trade agreement obligations.  With popula-
tion growth increasing demand, and improvements in technolo-
gy making long distance transfer of water feasible, it seems
unlikely that North America will be able to avoid water trade
conflicts.  A level of consistency between state law regimes could
mitigate the threat and expense of international conflicts.   
WATER SCARCITY COAST TO COAST
The United States is experiencing droughts from New York
to Texas, aquifers that drain faster than they can be recharged and
shortages in cities and farming regions.  Former Colorado
Attorney General Ken Salazar has predicted “the greatest water
war we have seen in decades and decades” if the state’s five-year
drought continues, since rivers that flow through six other states
begin in Colorado.1 Private companies
are responding to the expected scarcity by
obtaining leases to public and private
water rights.  The market for bulk water
transfers is already attracting municipal
consumers anxious to secure consistent
and long-term sources of water.  Farmers
are earning so much from selling their
water to municipalities and companies
investing in water pipelines that water is
often referred to as the “farmers’ 401K.”
However, the impact that water transfers
will have on the quality of farm land, the
environment, public health, and the econ-
omy of farming communities is largely
unknown. “[I]rreplaceable water is a pub-
lic safety issue,” said Texas Agriculture
Commissioner Susan Combs, “All eco-
nomic activity follows water – develop-
ment, jobs, houses, hospitals, nursing
homes – every single location depends on
water.”2 The U.S. will have to decide if
water allocation is best left to the supply
and demand of the open market or to a
coordinated government effort that allo-
cates resources in the public interest.
Because the two may not be mutually exclusive, balancing pub-
lic and private control will be a challenge in the near future.  
PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN WATER RIGHTS
Water transfers are not new but are changing in volume and
foreign participation.  Some investors buy land and water rights
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Farmers from South Dakota to Texas share the
Ogallala Aquifer and may be affected by withdrawals
hundreds of miles away or the neighboring field. The
aquifer is being depleted faster than it can recharge.
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specifically to benefit from the demand for water.  Others
already have rights vested through land ownership or historical
usage .  In either case, selling the rights to bulk transfer compa-
nies is becoming a popular option.  
Colorado transfers tens of thousands of acre-feet (“af”)
through private, voluntary actions every year.3 (An acre-foot is
325,581 gallons, which is enough to flood an acre one foot deep
or supply a family of four for a year).  The majority of these
transfers comprised less than 5,000 af, excluding government
reclamation projects.  In a single transaction, the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California agreed to purchase
250,000 af of water taken out of private farm production in the
central valley.  U.S. Filter (then owned by French water giant
Veolia, formerly named Vivendi) purchased 45,000 acres of
farmland in order to participate in the sale.4 Azurix, owned by
the largest private provider of water services in the U.S., the
German corporation RWE, offered at one time to pay for the
Florida Everglades restoration in return for rights to a portion of
the water that it would then sell water to cities.5
The increasing level of private and foreign participation
raises questions about the water management role of both the
U.S. Government and international institutions.  U.S. water
markets are maturing and many countries have expressed inter-
est in purchasing bulk water.6 However, questions remain
regarding the effect on U.S. trade obligations once it has
allowed water to be transferred between basins or countries.
Some suggest that once one U.S. state sells water for bulk trans-
fer, all U.S. states will be obligated to allow trading partners
access to bulk water.  Since Sitka, Alaska has contracted through
a vendor to sell 40 million gallons of water per year to cus-
tomers from Hawaii to Singapore and Saudi Arabia, this ques-
tion is ripe for discussion in the U.S. 
PRIVATE MARKETING OF BULK TRANSFERS
Bulk transfers between countries have been going on for
years, but only recently has demand and the cost of technology
made North American ventures affordable for buyers worldwide
and profitable for entrepreneurs.  Right after the North American
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) was announced, Gerry White
of McCurdy Enterprises, a real estate firm in Newfoundland,7
offered to sell lake water to China in tankers; Canada has 20% of
the world’s fresh water.  However, many Canadians consider this
resource a part of their national heritage and are hesitant to sup-
port any commercial ventures to export water.  Although that
deal was not permitted, North America’s demand for water is
growing and will continue to put pressure on water-abundant
regions to sell.  In Mr. White’s opinion, “[t]rying to stop people
from selling water is like telling Saudi Arabia not to sell oil.”8
There are still some cost restraints to transoceanic water ship-
ments.  Many companies are investing now in the hope that
scarcity will drive the price up enough to make long distance
transfers a fiscally attractive option for cities in the U.S. market. 
T. BOONE PICKENS
Like other former oilmen, T. Boone Pickens has invested
heavily in the prospective water market.  Currently he has a per-
mit to pipe 200,000 af of water from under 90,000 acres9 to
cities around Dallas/Fort Worth.  The plan will require an initial
investment of $1.2 billion for the pipe structure and a sale price
of over $775 per af to make the transfer across hundreds of
miles profitable.10 (In comparision to $4 in Idaho, $596 in
Oklahoma and up to $900 in Southern California.)11 These
water transfers would reduce water available for irrigation in the
source community by 10% and use 50% of the water table in
four counties over the next 100 years.12 So far, Pickens has had
fewer takers than he expected, but he is confident that the mar-
ket will pick up.13 Other investors have demonstrated similar
confidence.  Stock analysts are pushing water as a great buy that
is sure to pay off due to the consistent profits in water industries,
the investment that will be required to update ancient or build
new drinking water systems to serve new growth, and the value
added by scarcity.  Indeed, water-related transactions are already
worth $400 billion per year.14
RIO NUEVO
There are more than 30 groundwater schemes proposed in
Texas as of March 2004.  One of the largest is a proposal to pump
50,000 af from six arid counties to cities in west Texas. 15 Rio
Nuevo, a limited liability company comprised of oil, gas, and
communications businessmen, is planning to mine water from
more than 640,000 acres.  Rio Nuevo has applied to lease
355,000 acres of state land in Texas and has obtained the water
rights to approximately 290,000 acres from hundreds of private
properties.  Public opposition to the venture is high, but the State
General Land Office (“GLO”) has made clear its interest in the
sale of state water.16 Through the GLO, Texas would earn roy-
alties similar to payments for coal or oil.  These revenues would
be earmarked for education budgets.  This has created conflict
between state and local officials in the Rio Nuevo case, though;
communities that neighbor the state lands and share the aquifer
are not convinced that the increase in state revenues is worth the
possible decrease in property value that may result from the
water mining.  Rio Nuevo has stated that it will only take as
much water from the ground as farmers would have used to irri-
gate their land.  Nevertheless, the volume worries hydro-geolo-
gist Marshall Jennings of Texas State University in San Marcos,
who says that the withdrawals will be unsustainable at two to six
times the recharge rate.17 Rio Nuevo demonstrated their lack of
water savvy in their first proposal by suggesting that they would
transport the water down the Rio Grande, which would cause a
good percentage of their investment to literally evaporate.
U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO GROWING
MARKETS
Water law in the United States is a prime example of feder-
alism at work. The criteria for awarding permits or changes of
use (generally from agriculture to municipal or environmental
use) vary by state, creating a patchwork of surface water and
ground water regulations.  Most western states follow systems of
prior appropriation or court adjudicated rights; whereas, eastern
states generally follow a common law riparian system.
Recognizing that the “reasonable use” standard of common-law
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riparian doctrine is too fluid to manage water withdrawals in a
market economy, many riparian areas (e.g. Florida, Virginia) are
developing more detailed water laws that codify historical use
within a permit system.18 While markets are often created for
efficient transfers during times of drought, a permit and registra-
tion system provides regulators a baseline for future allocations.
Similarly, a transferable-use system relies on defined property
rights provided by the permit system.19 Still, these state-level
property rights cannot conflict with federal law standards, which
include treaties, as laid out in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.  Thus alterations to the permit and property regime
must conform to the 5th and 14th Amendment takings clause.  
TRADITIONAL REGULATION OF WATER RIGHTS
Water may receive less protection than other property in the
U.S. takings system because it is shared and re-used.  Generally,
real property rights or copyrights include the right to exclude all
others from use of the property.  However, water rights in the
United States are usufructory, meaning that the holder has the
right to use a certain volume of water but does not own that
physical unit of water outright unless it has been legally cap-
tured.  The holder of the water right is limited by obligations to
other right holders to use the water reasonably and return
enough of the water either downstream or to the aquifer to sup-
ply other approved uses of water.
Water is also distinguished from other property because of
the historical recognition that a water right is protected by rea-
sonable and beneficial use of water rather than by mere, unexer-
cised possession.20 In Hudson County Water v. McCarter,
Justice Holmes asserted that the public had an indisputable and
omnipresent interest in maintaining rivers at full capacity.21 The
exception, he wrote, was when water was diverted for a better
use, assuming it is restored afterward.  He reasoned that private
uses should be forbidden from diminishing “one of the great
foundations of public welfare and health.”22 Justice Holmes
made that proclamation in 1908 and clearly communicated the
position of the Supreme Court on the need to strike a balance
between private profit and public good.  Takings legislation is
largely focused on the reasonable expectation of the investor.
Both this and subsequent court decisions serve as notice to rights
holders that the property right in water is not absolute and may
be taken without compensation in certain circumstances.23 In
light of the new pressures to share water internationally, Holmes’
statement is informative as to the rights of downstream users.
Holmes not only speaks of reasonable use but also of the return
of the water for downstream users.  This theme is popular in U.S.
water litigation.  It would seem on its face that, at least for sur-
face waters, export would permanently deprive the downstream
user of use of the water.  If this deprivation of access to water
harms downstream users, they might be able to stop the with-
drawal.  Such issues may be common if bulk transfers of water
become more accepted through the market or treaty obligations. 
TEXAS
Texas has made great strides in water management in the
last ten years, including the creation of 88 groundwater man-
agement districts to track and permit water withdrawals and
use.  The Edwards Aquifer Authority set a 450,000 af cap on
withdrawals to make sure that the aquifer is not depleted faster
than it can be recharged.24 Texas has taken these steps to bet-
ter control diversions and water uses, since the Texas Water
Development Board has estimated that over the next 50 years
the state will have to conserve or find replacement water for 5
million af.25 However, in areas that are not controlled by a
groundwater management district, Texas still follows the rule
of capture.  The rule of capture allows landowners to take
unlimited quantities of water regardless of the impact on neigh-
boring wells.  An estimated 60% of the Rio Nuevo project is
from land governed by this common law system.26 In response
to this project, Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst created a state
Senate committee specifically to investigate state water leases.
This committee has commissioned a study to quantify the
groundwater available for transfer without environmental
harm.  Of note, Dewhurst rejected the Rio Nuevo project when
he was the land commissioner.27
WEST VIRGINIA
West Virginia passed its first water rights statute last year,
making some business groups concerned that they might lose
access to state water.28 The statute declares that all water not
privately owned or subject to a riparian right is “held by the
state in stewardship” for all citizens of the state.29
Additionally, the state is starting a registration system to track
current and future water use.  
GREAT LAKES
Congress amended the Water Resources Development Act
in 2000 to allow the Great Lakes to prohibit any diversion or
export from the lakes unless all eight Great Lakes governors
consent.30 Generally this would be considered a violation of the
dormant commerce clause since it limits the transfer of goods
(water) from the lakes.  The United States Supreme Court decid-
ed in Sphorhase v. Nebraska that a state could not consider out-
of-state transfers as a basis for denying a permit.31 The Great
Lakes are a special case due to significant sharing of the
resource with Canada.  The region has been co-governed under
the International Joint Commission just as the Mexico – U.S.
border water is governed by the International Boundary Water
Commission. In response to NAFTA as well as internal pres-
sures to sell water abroad, Canada placed a temporary moratori-
um on bulk water transfers and raised awareness of management
challenges with the U.S. Great Lakes region.
Since that time, the Council of Great Lakes Governors
(“CGLG”) has drafted the Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001
(“Annex”) that lays out an approval process for all withdrawals
from the lakes.32 The CGLG consists of the governors from the
eight states that border the lakes and the premiers of two
Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec). The goals of the
Annex are to preserve economic and social development and
environmental protection.  The Annex requires a supermajority
vote 33 to approve all diversions or consumptive uses over five
million gallons per day (“mgd”) with lesser quantities left to the
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states.  In order to measure the current use of lake water each
state must begin to register all withdrawals over 100,000 gallons
per day system within a year of the Annex going into effect.34
This will be a significant step toward greater control, since
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Indiana do not require permits or
registration at this time.35 Most relevant to this discussion is the
requirement that water withdrawn from the lakes must be
returned to the same basin or with special permission to some-
where else in the watershed.36 This restriction creates a prefer-
ence for local users since it makes long distance transfers more
expensive.  The Council of Canadians has raised concerns that
the Great Lakes plan is too permissive and will encourage
greater water use rather than sustainable levels,37 and business
interests have suggested that it is too strict and the thresholds for
regional review too low.38 Some of the legal opinions offered
to the CGLG suggest that this forward-looking undertaking is
likely to have trade implications.39
TRADE AGREEMENT CONCERNS
Although the United States has been a member of trade
agreements for most of its history, fiscal liability of the country
for domestic regulation is new.  The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) was created after WWII to avoid
trade wars and promote growth of the world economy.  The
treaty related to tariffs and customs provisions at the border.
During the last decade the U.S. has pursued several additional
multinational free trade agreements. The World Trade
Organisation was established in 1995 to oversee the GATT and
the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) to
which there are now 148 member countries.  GATS requires
governments to subject selected public services to open bidding
and restricts mechanisms that give government agencies a com-
petitive advantage.  GATS is relevant to the water debate, but is
outside the scope of this paper.40
GATT was a voluntary agreement prior to 1995.
Concurrent with the establishment of the WTO, the obligations
became binding and violations subject to retaliatory sanctions.
Disputes regarding the GATT and GATS are heard at the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”).  Three panelists hear the two countries and make a
binding decision.  The panel interprets the plain language of the
text using international common law standards, not the law of
either Party nation.
NAFTA was signed in 1993 by Canada, Mexico, and the
United States and created a status for foreign investor equivalent
to that of nation states.  These disputes are also heard by an
international tribunal either under ICSID or the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules.
NAFTA set new standards for governance of free trade agree-
ments subjecting non-compliant nations to significant fines.
NAFTA has been used as a template for bilateral investment
treaties and regional agreements, for example the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) and the Chile-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement.  
International trade agreements are designed to promote the
free movement of goods, services, and capital, and to limit gov-
ernment interference with the free market.  Current U.S. com-
mitments under goods and services treaties arguably limit gov-
ernment measures related to water management. The threat of
international disputes may impact environmental legislation and
conservation efforts or change the dynamic between the permit-
ting agencies and the applicants.  Some environmentalists fear
that trade agreements may allow Parties to export large quanti-
ties of water depleting local supplies for human consumption
and damaging the environment.41
WATER AS A “GOOD” 
The term “good” refers to a commodity that “can be valued
in money and so be the subject of commercial transactions.”42
former U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) Mickey Kantor
stated, “[w]hen water is traded as a good, all provisions of the
agreements governing trade in goods apply,” suggesting that no
special protection has been reserved for water.43 More recent-
ly current USTR Robert Zoellick reiterated this in the context
of bottled water, saying that “nothing in the WTO agreement
requires local authorities to permit bulk extractions of water
that would be contrary to sound resource management and con-
servation or that would create hazards to human health. Of
course, once local authorities decide to permit bulk water to be
extracted from an aquifer, bottled, and sold as an article of
commerce, WTO rules would likely apply to the sale of that
article of commerce.”44 Water was included as a good in the
voluntary GATT treaty45 and NAFTA adopted by reference the
GATT definition of water as a commodity and the GATT rules
for the non-discriminatory use of goods.46 In essence, for pur-
poses of international trade, water is considered a good and
could be treated like any other commodity. 
COVERAGE OF WATER UNDER FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS
There has been a debate about whether water is covered by
NAFTA and whether the trade agreement grants foreign
investors rights to export the resource.  In response to public
outcry, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico released a letter before the
26WINTER 2004 
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treaty was signed that may have created confusion by saying
that water is not included in NAFTA or any other treaty.47 This
conflicts with the text of GATT and statements from the USTR,
and illustrates the conflict between the popular demand that
water be given special consideration and the commodity status
of water in trade negotiations.  NAFTA not only adopted the
GATT language regarding water, but it broadened the scope of
the United States commitment.  Mel Clark, former senior trade
negotiator, interpreted NAFTA as stepping beyond GATT by
regulating exports as well as imports.48 Under GATT, a nation
could put high taxes on products or resources that were export-
ed.  GATT was focused on keeping import tariffs low and cus-
toms procedures at the border streamlined.49
After more than 50 years of negotiations, tariffs are at an all
time low.  The new generation of treaties includes services and
attempts to create a predictable, stable, and level playing field
by discouraging or eliminating government measures that are
non-tariff barriers to trade such as performance bonds, residen-
cy requirements, local resource content, and subsidies.50 Article
201 of NAFTA defines government measures as any law, regu-
lation, procedure, requirement, or practice.51 Regulations at all
government levels are presumed to be barriers to trade if they
restrict the free flow of goods, services, or capital.  The burden
is on the government to prove that a law is necessary rather than
enjoying the principle that laws are rationally related to the pub-
lic interest.  In order to provide the regulatory climate for this
strategy, the participating countries agree to a set of internation-
al guidelines that limit the powers of national and sub-national
discretion in lawmaking.52
CAUSES OF ACTION: EXPROPRIATION AND NATIONAL
TREATMENT VIOLATIONS
Expropriation
Trade agreements have historically contained an investor
chapter ensuring that Party countries would not nationalize
investments made within their borders.  Conflicts were resolved
diplomatically between countries.  NAFTA included a novel
form of dispute resolution that gives investors access to an inter-
national tribunal instead of the U.S. or trading Party’s court sys-
tem.  Investors can bring Party nations into arbitration if a gov-
ernment measure interferes with the profits expected from an
investment.  Changes to water permits or the ability to transfer
water after a foreign investor has bought water rights might be
considered “expropriation” if the change interfered with the
return on an investment in the U.S.  If a community levied
export taxes on water to discourage transfers from the basin, it
might be interpreted as an expropriation by a dispute panel.
NAFTA Article 314 specifically prohibits export taxes since
these taxes interfere with the free flow of goods; so the export
tax allowed under GATT as a management option may carry
trade liability.53 It should be noted that although the U.S.
reserved the right to limit the export of logs, it made no explic-
it exception for water.54
Expropriation is similar to the U.S. takings law, but proper-
ty is broadly defined to include market share and future profits,
and compensation may be awarded for partial losses of profit or
loss of a particular use.  There is no clear formula that explains
how such losses might be calculated, but it is clear from past
dispute awards that partial takings will be rewarded.55 Loss of
value due to regulations is not recoverable in the U.S. courts if
value remains and other economic uses exist.  The trade agree-
ment text and past decisions indicate that the arbitration panels
may treat land use planning, the character of ownership rights,
and obligations to share natural resources with participating
nations significantly differently than domestic courts.
National Treatment
NAFTA Chapters 3 and 11 may obligate the Parties to give
each other access to natural resources by requiring “national
treatment,” meaning Party nations must treat foreign investors’
property rights at least as well as domestic investors, or the
nation may have to pay for the right to discriminate.  Any gov-
ernment measure that gives domestic users a competitive advan-
tage might be a violation of national treatment.  The Great Lakes
Annex, for example, may be exposed to some risk due to the
requirement to return water withdrawn to the basin, which effec-
tively bars bulk transfers from the basin.  
THE EXCEPTION FOR EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES
NAFTA also adopts by reference the exception for govern-
ment measures enacted primarily to conserve “exhaustible natural
resources,” which may include water.56 The term is not defined
in either trade instrument, and it has been argued in the literature
that water is recyclable and therefore would not fit in this catego-
ry.  If water is not considered exhaustible then government agen-
cies would not be able to use the exception to justify special treat-
ment for water resources and might face trade sanctions. 
The exceptions to the trade rule recognize a government’s
right to take measures “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health.”  However, obligations to other Parties qual-
ify that right to regulate.  The exhaustible resources exception
states clearly that these measures may include regulations
“essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in gener-
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"The NAFTA creates no rights to the
natural water resources of any Party to the
agreement …nothing in the NAFTA would
oblige any NAFTA party to either exploit
its water for commercial use or begin
exporting its water in any form.  Water in
its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs,
aquifers, water basins and the like is not a
good or product, it is not traded, and
therefore is not and never has been subject
to the terms of any trade agreement.”   
1993 Joint Statement by the Governments of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
al or local short supply,” but goes further to say that “all coun-
tries are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply
of resources.”57 The exception further requires that any restric-
tions to conserve exhaustible resources must be applied equally
to domestic and foreign producers and consumers.  A three-part
test measures the legitimacy of the regulation by considering
whether (1) domestic restrictions are equal to the foreign restric-
tions; (2) the objective is primarily conservation related; and (3)
the land involved is within national jurisdiction.58
If water were defined as an exhaustible resource, NAFTA
Articles 309 and 315 requiring “proportional sharing” of traded
goods would apply.  Like national treatment, proportional shar-
ing severely restricts a government’s right to limit exports in
natural resources once trade has been established.  For example,
if bulk exports of water are allowed up to a certain amount, the
average amount of the previous 36 months would have to be
continued regardless of changes in the availability of water.59 A
country would have to grant a foreign investor continuing
access proportional to the continued access of domestic users
(i.e. a 10% decrease for one must be matched by a 10% decrease
for the other).  These requirements are not assuaged by any
mechanism allowing for changes in circumstances in the export-
ing country.  As a result, a community may choose to restrict
foreign access to water, but the U.S. might have to pay com-
pensation to disappointed investors or service providers that
lose business.  
WATER DISPUTES UNDER TRADE AGREEMENTS
Most NAFTA claims are filed against domestic environ-
mental laws.  Sun Belt, Inc. a U.S. company that had contracted
to move Canadian water to northern California, claimed that a
temporary moratorium on water transfers was an expropriation
of their investment.  While their Canadian partner settled out of
court for several hundred thousand dollars, Sun Belt chose to
file a claim under NAFTA for $10 billion, representing scarcity
profits over time.60 While the case has not proceeded, planners
and regulators would benefit from understanding the conditions
that made such a claim appealing.
BECHTEL V. BOLIVIA
Obtaining an investor-to-state dispute settlement is very
valuable to multinational companies (“MNCs”) that do not
trust the local court systems in the countries in which they
invest or want a lower threshold for takings compensation than
the host country law provides.  As part of its legal strategy,
U.S.-based Bechtel incorporated its subsidiary, Aguas del
Tunari, in the Netherlands when it signed a contract with
Bolivia to provide water and sewerage services.  This action,
taken two years before the dispute arose, earned Bechtel access
to file a $25 million claim61 for compensation under a treaty
between the Netherlands and Bolivia.  The U.S. did not have an
investment treaty with Bolivia that would have forced Bechtel
to sue in the Bolivian courts had it not registered a subsidiary
in the Netherlands.  Bechtel’s sophisticated use of the trade
arena is an important lesson that is sometimes overlooked.
This technique of “forum shopping” creates obligations to
investors from countries that were not negotiated or ratified by
both Parties.  Bolivia made a commitment to the Netherlands,
not the U.S.  Bolivia may have made a different choice had this
loophole been evident at the time of the agreement.  Similarly,
most international arbitration has been between private MNCs
and governments unfamiliar with the international laws inter-
preted by the arbitration panelists.  
RIO GRANDE VALLEY IRRIGATORS V. MEXICO
August 27, 2004 marked the first time a government agency
filed notice to submit a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11 on
investment. Citing frustration with the U.S. State Department’s
slow diplomatic negotiations with Mexico, seventeen irrigation
districts representing farmers, ranchers and landowners, 29
independent water right holders, and a water supply company
came together to demand $500 million from Mexico for expro-
priating their investments in water.62 Private property attorneys
are representing the group in their claim that Mexico illegally
withheld over one million af of water owed to the U.S. under a
1944 treaty. They claim that Mexico diverted the water to help
its farmers increase productivity while driving Texas farmers
out of business through man-made drought.  This kind of
favoritism is a violation of the investor protections of NAFTA,
and the claim alleges both national treatment and expropriation
claims.  At the time of this printing, the parties are within the 90-
day waiting period between the “Notice to Submit a Claim” and
the actual filing.  The dispute settlement rules require a 90-day
cooling off period in hope that the parties will settle the dispute
without arbitration.  If successful, the claimants will receive
compensation from Mexico.  
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF WATER TRANSFER
Though many states and regions are proactively developing
permit and registration systems (e.g. the Great Lakes Annex, the
Florida/Georgia/Alabama river compact, and Texas
Groundwater Districts), many questions surrounding the effects
of water transfers have not been adequately researched.  Little is
known about the economic and environmental impact of the
source or destination communities.  In addition to the obvious
conflict between in-stream water levels for the fishing industry,
communities may lose terrestrial recreation revenues from game
hunting and other ecotourism.  There is also likely to be a mul-
tiplier effect on farming communities that lose employed farm
hands, feed stores, mechanics, and restaurants to water farmers
who remove their land from production.  As Rex Buchanan of
the Kansas Geological Survey observed, there is “an amazing
ripple effect because of the water.  Without water, you don’t
have corn.  Without corn you don’t have feedlots.  And without
feedlots, you don’t have meat packing plants.”63 As a Culberson
County, Texas man faced with the Rio Nuevo project noted,
“when our windmills don’t pump water then we have no value,”
which in turn leads to devaluation of the land, lower tax rev-
enues, and smaller budgets for schools and public services.64 It
is more than a question of prioritizing between using 6,000 af of
water to grow one acre of melons or supplying 6,000 families
with water for a year.
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CONCLUSION
Trade agreements encourage free markets for goods and
services and discourage government interference.  Bulk water
transfers under these conditions require a more coordinated
approach to water management.  There has not been enough
focus on the long-term effects of inter-basin bulk water transfers
or water exports.  By allowing and encouraging increased trans-
fers from agricultural to municipal uses as well as the purchase
of bulk transfers, governments are setting precedents for future
investors.  The cost of the transfers on the open market may be
used to value takings cases when laws are put in place later due
to data suggesting that environmental harm is occurring in
source areas.  Foreign investors might invest without under-
standing the usufructory property status of water or the authori-
ty of the government to manage water for the public good.
Ambiguity in water laws might lead to claims brought under
trade agreements that undermine state and local efforts to
responsibly manage the resource.  In 2005, the administration
plans to sign at least four bilateral investment treaties and two
regional trade agreements with investor-state provisions.  States
and localities would benefit from having a coordinated water
strategy before investment increases and expectations of permit
approvals create compensable takings claims in the U.S. or the
international arena.  
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